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Notes
Not-So-Candid Camera, Please: Law
Enforcement Officers Violate the Fourth
Amendment When the Media Tags Along
Wilson v. Layne' and Hanlon v. Berge?_

I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of television shows such as "Cops" 3 evidences how
common it has become for members of the media to accompany law
enforcement officers while they perform their daily duties. This recent
proliferation has sparked questions as to when the media's involvement in law
enforcement impinges on an individual's constitutional rights. The federal
courts of appeals have disagreed over whether the Fourth Amendment is violated
when the media tags along with law enforcement officers executing a warrant in
a private home. In Wilson v. Layne and Hanlon v. Berger, the United States
Supreme Court settled the debate over this issue by holding that the presence of
the media in a private home, while law enforcement officers execute a warrant,
constitutes a violation of an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures.4 The Court also held, however, that the state
of the law was not clearly established, so the officers involved in these cases
were entitled to qualified immunity.' While the Court's decision "clearly
established" that media ride-alongs to private homes violate the Fourth
Amendment, it left open the question of how far beyond the home the ride-along
prohibition extends and to what extent the media will be liable for its
participation in such events.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The litigation in these companion cases arose after federal law enforcement
officers invited members of the media to accompany them onto private property
while the officers executed warrants. Wilson v. Layne6 arose from a media ridealong with United States Marshals and Montgomery County, Maryland police

1. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
2. 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
3. "Cops" is a television show that airs on Fox and Court TV. Cameramen
accompany police officers during their shifts and video tape the officers in action.
4. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605-06.
5. Id.
6. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
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officers. The law enforcement officers were executing an arrest warrant as part
of "Operation Gunsmoke," a special national fugitive apprehension program in
which the Marshals were working with state and local police to apprehend

dangerous criminals.' One ofthe targeted fugitives was Dominic Wilson, whose
address was listed as 909 North Stone Street Avenue, Rockville, Maryland.8
Unknown to the police officer, this address was actually the home of Charles and
Geraldine Wilson.9
Pursuant to a Marshal's Service ride-along policy," the team of law
enforcement officers executing the arrest warrant on Dominic Wilson was
accompanied by a reporter and a photographer from the Washington Post.11 At
approximately 6:45 a.m. on April 16, 1992, the officers and media
representatives entered the Wilsons' home, while the Wilsons were still asleep
in bed. 2 When the Wilsons heard the officers enter their home, Charles Wilson,
wearing only his underwear, ran into the living room to investigate. 3 Charles
Wilson was angry to find at least five men in street clothes with guns in his
living room, and officers mistook him for an angry Dominic Wilson and
proceeded to subdue him on the floor. 4 At that time, Geraldine Wilson entered
the living room dressed in only a nightgown and found her husband pinned face
down on the floor with an officer holding a gun to her husband's head. 5 After
learning that Dominic Wilson was not in the house, police officers and media
representatives departed, but not before the Washington Postphotographer and
reporter had an opportunity to take pictures and observe the confrontation
between the police and Charles Wilson.'6

7. Id. at 606. The warrant read:
The State of Maryland, to any duly authorized peace officer, greeting: you
are hereby commanded to take Dominic Jerome Wilson if he/she shall be
found in your bailiwick, and have him immediately before the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County, now in session, at the Judicial Center, in Rockville,
to answer an indictment, or information, or criminal appeals unto the State of
Maryland, of and concerning a certain charge of Robbery [Violation of
Probation] by him committed, as hath been presented, and so forth. Hereof
fail not at your peril, and have you then and there this writ. Witness.

Id. at 606 n.1.
8. Id. at 606.
9. Id. Charles and Geraldine were Dominic's parents. Id.

10. Id. at 624-25.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 120 (4th Cir. 1998).
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 607 (1999).
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Relying on Bivens v. Six Unknown FederalNarcoticsAgents, 17 Charles and
Geraldine Wilson filed suit against the law enforcement officers in their personal
capacities seeking monetary damages. 8 The Wilsons chose not to file suit
against the Washington Post,the reporter, or the photographer. The Wilsons
contended that the officers' actions in bringing members of the media into their
home to observe and record the attempted execution of the arrest warrant
violated their Fourth Amendment rights.' 9 The officers moved for summary
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, 0 and the district court denied that
motion.2' The Fourth Circuit heard the case on interlocutory appeal, and, after
twice rehearing the case en banc, ultimately upheld the defense of qualified
immunity. The Fourth Circuit declined to decide if the actions of the police
officers violated the Fourth Amendment. However, the court did conclude that,
at the time of the search, the right violated by the media's presence during the
execution of a warrant in a private residence was not clearly established, and
thus the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.' The Wilsons appealed to
the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari simultaneously with Hanlon v.
Berger,' a similar case arising out of the Ninth Circuit.
The Hanlon plaintiffs were Paul and Erma Berger, who live on a 75,000acre ranch in Montana.24 After former employees of the Bergers notified United
States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS") agents that they had seen Paul
Berger kill bald eagles, the USFWS initiated an investigation of the Bergers.'
17. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Under Bivens, a plaintiff may seek monetary damages
from a federal government official who has violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment
rights.
18. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608. The Wilsons sued the state officials under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994), which applies to state actors.
19. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the

persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
20. Government officials performing discretionary functions are generally granted
qualified immunity and are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
21. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608.
22. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that because at the time of the search no court

had held that the presence of the media during a police entry into a private residence
violated the Fourth Amendment, the right allegedly violated by the officials was not
"clearly established," so qualified immunity was proper. Id.
23. 526 U.S. 808 (1999).

24. Id. at 809.
25. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1154 (1999).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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Jack Hamann, an employee of Cable News Network, Inc. ("CNN"), and Robert
Rainey and Donald Hooper, employees of Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
("TBS"), approached the USFWS agents to negotiate a television deal
concerning the investigation.26 The three parties entered into an agreement on
March 11, 1993.27
Subsequent to the television deal, a magistrate judge issued a search warrant
for evidence indicating the taking of wildlife off the Bergers' ranch. The warrant
authorized the search of the ranch and appurtenant structures, but excluded the
Bergers' residence.? On the morning of the search, federal agents, along with
the broadcast team, proceeded to a point near the Bergers' ranch.29 Media
cameras were mounted on the outside and interior of government vehicles in
order to videotape the agents at work. USFWS Special Agent Joel Scrafford was
also wired with a hidden CNN microphone that continuously transmitted live
audio to the CNN technical crew.3° Agent Scrafford met Paul Berger on the road
leading to the ranch, and the two men proceeded together to the house, which
Agent Scrafford entered with Paul Berger's permission.' Though Agent
Scrafford recorded all of the conversations he had with the Bergers while inside
the house, the Bergers were not informed that Agent Scrafford was wired or that
the cameras that were visible during the search belonged to the media.3" Both
the video footage
and sound recordings made in the Bergers' home were later
33
broadcast.
As a result of the search, Paul Berger was charged with numerous violations
of federal wildlife laws,' but he was acquitted of all charges with the exception

26. Id.
27. Id. The letter confirming the agreement states:
[T]he United States Attorney's Office for the District of Montana agrees to
allow CNN to accompany USFWS Agents as they attempt to execute a
criminal search warrant .... Except as provided below, CNN shall have
complete editorial control over any footage it shoots; it shall not be obliged
to use the footage; and does not waive any rights or privileges it may have
with respect to the footage. Inreturn, CNN agrees to embargo the telecast of
any videotape of the attempt to execute the search warrant until either: (1) a
jury has been empaneled and instructed by a judge not to view television
reports about the case; or (2) the defendant waives his right to a jury trial and
agrees to have his case tried before a judge; or (3) a judge accepts a plea
bargain; or (4) the government decides not to bring charges relating to the
attempt to execute the search warrant.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 509.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The unsuccessful charges were the taking of at least one golden eagle, in
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of one misdemeanor charge for using a registered pesticide, Furadan, in a
manner inconsistent with its labeling.35 After the criminal trial, the Bergers filed
suit under Bivens against both the media and the federal agents alleging
violations of their Fourth Amendment rights.36 The Bergers also filed suit
against the media for the violation of the Federal Wiretap Act,37 for the state law
torts of conversion, trespass, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
to enjoin further broadcasts of the video shot at their ranch.38 Relying on Bivens,
the Bergers argued that the federal agents involved in the search warrant violated
their Fourth Amendment rights by permitting television cameras to film the
search, and that the media acted sufficiently in concert with the federal agents
to be held accountable for the violation as government actors.39
Similar to the Fourth Circuit in Wilson,' the district court in this case ruled
that the federal agents were entitled to qualified immunity because there was no
clearly established law at the time protecting an individual from the commercial
recording of a search of his residence." The court rejected the Bergers' claim
that the media had become government actors for the purpose of Bivens
liability.42 The Bergers appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which reversed the lower
court's ruling and held that the federal agents were not entitled to qualified
immunity, and that the media had acted "under color of law" and were therefore
also liable under Bivens.43 Both the federal agents and the media appealed to the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari only to the federal agents."

violation of 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (1994); the killing of one ferrunginous hawk, and one
ring-billed gull, in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1994) and 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (1994);
and the taking of at least one bald eagle in violation of 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) and 16
U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1994).
35. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1154 (1999). The charge was that Paul Berger applied Furadan to sheep carcasses
intending to kill predators, including eagles, in violation of 7 U.S.C. § 136j(a)(2)(G)
(1994).

36. See supranote 17 and accompanying text.
37. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
38. Berger, 129 F.3d at 507.
39. Id.
40. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998).
41. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S.
1154 (1999). Additionally, on the basis of collateral estoppel, the court disallowed the
Bergers from litigating the reasonableness of the search because that issue had previously
been decided against Paul Berger at his criminal trial. Id.
42. Id. The district court ruled that the media were not liable under the Federal
Wiretap Act or any of the state law claims. The district court also declined to enjoin
future broadcasts. Id.
43. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling on collateral estoppel,
trespass, and infliction of emotional distress and affirmed the district court's rulings
regarding the Federal Wiretap Act, the conversion claim, and its decision not to issue an
injunction. Id.
44. See Berger v. CNN, Inc., 525 U.S. 961 (1998); Hanlon v. Berger, 525 U.S. 981
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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The Supreme Court decided Wilson andHanlon as companion cases." The
law enforcement officials in both cases argued that regardless of whether they
violated the Fourth Amendment rights of the Wilsons and the Bergers, they were
entitled to the defense of qualified immunity.' The Court held that: (1) law
enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when
they allow members of the media to accompany them in a private residence
during the execution of a warrant; and (2) because the law was not clearly
established on this issue, the law enforcement officers in both cases were entitled
to the defense of qualified immunity.'
Ill. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. FourthAmendment ProtectsAgainst Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
In determining what constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has traditionally held law enforcement officers to a higher
standard if the search was of an individual's home.4" The rule is clear-absent
a warrant or exigent circumstances, police officers cannot enter a home to make
an arrest or to seize property.49 When an arrest or seizure takes place in public,
however, the standard is not as strict. An arrest without a warrant in public is
valid as long as the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that the
suspect was a felon.s Permissible actions, once a warrant has been issued,
however, are not quite as clear.
Though the Court has held that not every police action inside an
individual's home must be explicitly authorized by the text of the warrant,"' if
the scope of the search exceeds that permitted by the terms of the warrant, the
subsequent seizure is unconstitutional. 2 In order for a search to be permissible
under the Fourth Amendment, police actions in the execution of a warrant must

(1998).
45. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
46. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613; Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.

47. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605-06; Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
48. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609-10; see also United States v. United States Dist.

Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) ("physical entry of the home
is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed");
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) ("At the very core [of the Fourth
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.").
49. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
50. Id.
51. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692,705 (1981).
/
52. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 140 (1990).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/4
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relate to the objectives of the authorized intrusion or reasonably relate to the
accomplishment of legitimate law enforcement objectives. 3
The Supreme Court has allowed the presence of third parties during a
search when the third parties directly aid in the execution of a warrant, such as
for the purpose of identifying stolen property. 4 The presence of third parties is
permissible if such an instance would be related to the objectives of the
authorized intrusion. Additionally, the use of video cameras has been
recognized as a reasonable measure of "quality control" in ensuring the
protection of an individual's rights." The Court has also recognized the
importance of the press in informing the public about the administration of
criminal justice.56 Lower courts prior to Wilson, however, took divergent views
of how these cases affected the
presence of the media during the execution of a
57
warrant on private property.

B. Liability UnderBivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Both Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 198358 allow a plaintiff to seek monetary
damages from a government official who has violated his Fourth Amendment

53. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d
680, 685 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1062 (1995); see also Maryland v.

Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 87 (1987) ("[T]he purposes justifying a police search strictly limit
the permissible extent of the search .. ").
54. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886); Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807, 817-18 (K.B. 1765).
55. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996).
56. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1975) ("[I]n a society
in which each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first
hand the operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring him
in convenient form the facts of those operations."); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc.
v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572-73 (1980).
57. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616 (1999).
58. Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not
be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of
the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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rights. 9 Where a federal statute provides for a right to sue for the invasion of
legal rights, federal courts may use any remedy to right the wrong.6" Bivens,
decided based on both the Fourth Amendment and Section 1983, allows a
plaintiff to seek compensation under federal law rather than seek redress in a
state court tort action. 6
Bivens and Section 1983 liability may also be imposed on non-government
officials if their actions are so closely tied to those of government officials that
they are found to be acting "under color of law."62 To act "under color of law"
does not require that the accused be an officer of the state. 3 Rather private
actors may be considered government actors if6they are willful participants in a
joint action with the government or its agents.
To be liable under Bivens and Section 1983, the court first determines
whether the law enforcement officers' actions are unconstitutional. 65 If so, the

court must then decide whether the officers are entitled to a grant of qualified
immunity.66 Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that must be plead by

a defendant official.67 Qualified immunity analysis is identical in suits brought
under either Section 1983 or BivensO and officers can be granted qualified
immunity to shield them from liability when their conduct does not violate
clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known. 69
Liability turns on the "objective legal reasonableness" of the action,
assessed in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time the
action was taken.7" Whether a rule is clearly established depends upon the level
of generality at which the rule is to be identified." For instance, the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures is clearly established by the Fourth
Amendment, but if the test of clearly established law were to be applied at such
a high level of generality, the "objective legal reasonableness" of the action
would not come into play.72

59. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607.

60. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971).
61. Id. at 390-91.

62. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
63. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
64. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980).

65. See Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,290-91 (1999).
66. Id.; see also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841-42 (1998);
Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1991).
67. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982).

68. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 n.9 (1989).
69.
70.
at 396.
71.
72.

See Harlow,457 U.S. at 818.
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987); see also Graham,490 U.S.
See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
Id. at 639-40.
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At the correct level of specificity, clearly established means that "[t]he
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.... [I]n the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness must be apparent."'73 Thus, the appropriate
question is whether a reasonable officer could have objectively believed that his
actions were lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the
officers possessed.74
Reasonableness therefore depends on the state of developed law. Where the
law is undeveloped, officers "cannot be expected to predict the future course of
constitutional law.. . .,75 However, an officer will not be shielded from liability
if he acts with such disregard for the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional
rights that his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.76
For instance, where a state judge used his official power to extort sexual favors
from a potential litigant, the Supreme Court declined to grant him qualified
immunity, even though no prior judicial opinion had held that such action was
unconstitutional. 7
C. The CircuitSplit
Courts have differed over whether media accompaniment during the
execution of a search warrant violates individuals' Fourth Amendment rights.7
In Wilson v. Layne,79 the Fourth Circuit held that "it was not clearly established
that permitting media representatives to accompany law enforcement officers
into a private residence to observe and photograph their attempt to execute an
arrest warrant would violate the homeowner's constitutional rights," but declined
to decide if such action was indeed a Fourth Amendment violation."0 The Fourth
Circuit reasoned that as the police officers only permitted the reporters who
accompanied them into the private residence to engage in activities the officers
themselves could have undertaken consistent with the warrant, the officers could
not have known if they were exceeding the scope of the warrant.8' The court
also noted that reasonable law enforcement officers could conclude that
permitting reporters to observe and photograph the events surrounding the

73. Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
74. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616 (1999).
75. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 562 (1978); see also Wood v. Strickland,
420 U.S. 308, 320-21 (1975); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967).
76. See Procunier,434 U.S. at 562.
77. See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997).
78. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998); Berger v. Hanlon,
129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997); Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996); Ayeni v.
Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1062 (1995).
79. 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 115.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000
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execution of an arrest warrant would serve a legitimate law enforcement
purpose, such as affording protection to the officers, improving public oversight
of law enforcement activities, and deterring crime and improper conduct by law
enforcement officers."2 As the court had already determined that the qualified
immunity doctrine would apply if the officers' conduct was indeed a Fourth
Amendment violation, it decided
not to determine whether the Fourth
S3
Amendment had been violated.
In Berger v. Hanlon,4 the Ninth Circuit held that federal agents and
accompanying media violated the Bergers' Fourth Amendment rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures." Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the Ninth
Circuit ruled that the media's presence was outside the scope of the warrant
because it could not have served law enforcement purposes; the media was
present to videotape the execution of the warrant for entertainment purposes, and
86
the search therefore violated the property owners' Fourth Amendment rights.
Additionally, the court held that neither the media nor the federal agents were
entitled to qualified immunity because the degree of cooperation and planning
that went on between the media and the agents before the warrant was executed
evidenced the media's active, rather than passive, role in executing the search
and showed that the main purpose of the search was for purposes other than law
enforcement.8
The Eighth Circuit, in Parkerv. Boyer,8 8 held that it was not "self-evident"
that the police were violating any Fourth Amendment rights by allowing the
media to enter a private residence. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that most courts
had rejected the argument that the Constitution forbids the media to encroach on
a person's property while the police search it,89 and those courts that had found
that there was a clearly established constitutional right forbidding the police from
allowing the media to enter a home during a search had issued their decisions
after the conduct at issue in this case had occurred.9" The court therefore held
that the law enforcement officials were entitled to qualified immunity because
they did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights of which they

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 116.
Id. at 119.
129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999).
Id. at 510.
Id.
Id. at 512.
93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1148 (1997).

89. Id. at 447; see also Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn. 1984);

Moncriefv. Hanton, No. 85-3076, 1985 WL 14124 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1985); Higbee v.
Times-Advocate, 5 Med. L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Prahl v. Brosamle, 195 N.W.2d
768 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980).
90. Parker,93 F.3d at 447.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/4
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should have been aware.91 The Eighth Circuit did not rule on whether the
conduct in the case violated the homeowners' Fourth Amendment rights.'
Finally, in Ayeni v. Mottola,93 the Second Circuit held that "Mottola
exceeded well-established principles when he brought into the Ayeni home
persons who were neither authorized by the warrant to be there nor serving any
legitimate law enforcement purpose by being there."'94 The Second Circuit
reasoned that because the objective of the Fourth Amendment is to preserve the
right of privacy to the extent consistent with the reasonable exercise of law
enforcement duties,95 and as the media's presence was not explicitly authorized
within the terms of the warrant,96 the officers violated a clearly established
constitutional right.97 The court also held that the police officers' conduct in
bringing the media along was "wholly lacking in justification based on the
legitimate needs of law enforcement."98
As the circuits that had issued decisions regarding whether media
accompaniment during the execution of a warrant violated an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights did not agree on an answer, the Supreme Court took up the
issue with an eye toward resolving it. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Wilson and Hanlon and sided with the Fourth Circuit.99
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
In Wilson and Hanlon the Supreme Court considered two issues on which
the lower federal circuit courts of appeals had disagreed. In so doing the Court
held that it is a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of homeowners when
a police officer brings a member of the media or other third party into a home
during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third party was not
in aid of the warrant's execution."° The Court further determined that the law

91. Id.
92. Id. at 448. The concurring judge held that the court skipped the Fourth
Amendment step of the two-part qualified immunity analysis, noting that "[ilt is not until
we have made this required decision that we analyze whether such right was clearly
established at the time of its alleged violation." Id. (Rosenbaum J., concurring).
93. 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
94. Id. at 686.

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. grantedin part,525 U.S.
981 (1998); Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. granted,525 U.S. 981
(1998).
100. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1999); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S.
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enforcement officers were entitled to a grant of qualified immunity because the
law on the question was not clearly established before the instant decisions.'
The law enforcement officials in both Wilson and Hanlon plead the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity to charges under Bivens and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983202 The Court initially addressed the Fourth Amendment question,
reasoning that before a court can evaluate a claim of qualified immunity, it must
first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual
constitutional right. Then, if a plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a
constitutional right, the court must determine whether the right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation.'0 3 Such an order of procedure,
the Court explained, promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct
and spares a defendant unwarranted liability and the unnecessary demands of a
long lawsuit.'
The Court's determination that the officers' actions violated the Fourth
Amendment was based on the traditional regard for the privacy of the home.
Because physical entry of the home is the primary evil against which the Fourth
Amendment protects, police officers cannot enter a home without a warrant or
exigent circumstances."0 5 Though the officers in Wilson and Hanlon possessed
warrants, the Court believed that the officers' actions in allowing the media to
accompany them exceeded the warrants' scope.0 6 The Court explained that
police actions in the execution of a warrant must be related to the objectives of
the authorized intrusion.'0 7
The Court determined that the presence of the reporters was not related to
the officers' objectives in the execution of the warrants because the media were
acting for their own private purposes. 8 Though the officers argued that the
presence of the media as third parties served the law enforcement purposes of
publicizing the government's efforts to combat crime and facilitate accurate
reporting of law enforcement activities, minimizing police abuses and protecting
suspects, and protecting the safety of the officers, the Court ruled that furthering
the law enforcement objectives of the police in a general sense was not related

808, 809 (1999). The Court's decision on the Fourth Amendment issue was unanimous.
101. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617-18; Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810. The Court's decision
on the qualified immunity issue was 8-1, with Justice Stevens dissenting. The Court,
which issued a full opinion in Wilson, issued only a short decision in Hanlon, citing its
reasoning in Wilson. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, all explanations of the Court's
reasoning apply to both cases.
102. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609; Hanlon, 526 U.S. at 810.
103. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 610.
106. Id. at 611.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 613-14.
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to the objectives of the authorized intrusion."° Hence, the Court made it clear
that "law enforcement objectives" must further the purposes of the particular
search, rather than merely the objectives of the police in a general sense. 1
Therefore, having found a violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court
proceeded to the issue of qualified immunity.
In concluding that the police officers in both Wilson and Hanlon were
entitled to a grant of qualified immunity, the Court noted that the rule on
qualified immunity is that law enforcement officers are shielded from liability
for civil damages so long as their conduct does not violate a clearly established
right of which a reasonable person would have known."' The Court explained
that practically applied, the "clearly established" requirement means, given preexisting law, the boundaries of the right must be sufficiently clear so that a
reasonable official would understand that his conduct violated that right.' 2
Applying this standard to Wilson and Hanlon, the Court concluded that it

would not have been unreasonable for an officer in 1992.. to believe that

bringing media observers along during the execution of a warrant was lawful." 4
The Court offered three reasons why an officer might have considered such
behavior reasonable. First, the constitutional question regarding whether the
Fourth Amendment was violated was not clear; it was not obvious that the
media's presence exceeded the scope of the warrant." s Second, media ridealongs were a common police practice and no judicial opinions existed that held
the practice was unlawful." 6 Finally, the officers had relied on formal ride-along
policies that did not prohibit media entry into private homes." 7
Furthermore, in the extremely limited case law addressing this issue, courts'
decisions were neither uniform nor controlling on federal appellate
jurisdictions."'
The Court explained that where judges disagree on a

109. Id. at 614.
110. Id. at 613-14.
111. Id. at 614.
112. Id. at 614-15.
113. The conduct in Hanlon took place a year later, but the Court stated that the
parties had not called the Court's attention to any decisions that would have made the
state of the law any clearer at the time the disputed search took place. Hanlon v. Berger,
526 U.S. 808, 809-10 (1999).
114. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 616-17 (1999).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697, 708 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 865 (1995) (holding that material issues of fact existed, precluding summary
judgment on the question of whether police officers exceeded the scope of a search
warrant when they allowed a private security guard to participate in a search to identify
stolen property other than that described in the warrant); Moncrief v. Hanton, No. 853076, 1985 WL 14124 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1985) (upholding a search where the media
entered a home on a non-Fourth Amendment theory); Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Med.
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constitutional question, it would be unfair to hold law enforcement officials
liable for choosing the losing side of the controversy." 9 The Court further
reasoned that where the relevant body of case law was undeveloped, it would not
have been unreasonable for law enforcement officials to rely on their
department's established policies.'
Therefore, because a reasonable officer
could have believed it was lawful for the media to accompany him into a home
while he executed a warrant, and because the officers could not be expected to
predict the future course of the law, the law enforcement officials were granted
qualified immunity121
B. Dissenting.Opinion
While Justice Stevens concurred with the majority in regard to the Fourth
Amendment issue, he believed that the right was clearly established before the
conduct in question and therefore would have denied the officers qualified
immunity.' 22 Justice Stevens rejected the majority's argument that the absence
of judicial opinions addressing the issue provided a basis for a reasonable belief
that allowed the media to accompany law enforcement officers into a home
*during the execution of a warrant as lawful behavior." He compared the instant
situations with an earlier case where the Court held that a state judge knew that
he was violating a potential litigant's constitutional rights when he used his
official power to extort sexual favors from her, even though there was no judicial
opinion specifically on point. 4
Moreover, Justice Stevens rejected the argument that media ride-alongs
were common police practice and that officials relied on department ride-along
policies to justify their actions because such documents were prepared for public
25
relations purposes, not by lawyers as a reliable source on the state of the law.
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the cases relied on by the majority to
describe the current boundaries of the law2 6 did not provide support for an
L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980) (also upholding such a search based upon a non-Fourth
Amendment theory); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 782 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980)
(holding that media accompanying police into a home was not unreasonable).
119. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
120. Id. at 617.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 618; Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 810 (1999).
123. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 619 (1999).
124. Id. at 623.
125. Id. at 626-27.
126. The majority cited a state court decision, Prahlv. Brosamle,295 N.W.2d 768
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980), and two unpublished district court decisions, Moncriefv. Hanton,
No. 85-3076, 1985 WL 14124 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1985), and Higbee v. Times-A dvocate,
5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980), in its assertion that the law regarding media
entry into homes during a police ride-along was not clearly established. Wilson, 526 U.S.
at 616.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol65/iss3/4

14

20001

Brackman: Brackman: Not-So-Candid Camera, Please:
MEDIA RIDE-ALONGS

officer's assumption that media accompaniment was lawful." 7 Therefore,
Justice Stevens would have refused the Court's grant of qualified immunity. 2 '
V. COMMENT
The Supreme Court's decisions in Wilson and Hanlon are important not
only for what the Court decided, but also for what issues the Court chose not to
address. It is important to note that the instant decisions clearly establish that
media accompaniment during the execution of a search warrant in a private
home violates the homeowner's Fourth Amendment rights; law enforcement
officials who allow such action after these decisions will not be entitled to the
qualified immunity defense.'2 By refusing to grant certiorari to the media,' the
Supreme Court left open the question as to what extent the media can be held
responsible for their participation in ride-alongs that include entry into an
individual's private home during the execution of a warrant. By finding a Fourth
Amendment violation without specifying the point at which the media's presence
makes the search unreasonable, it is unfortunately likely that the instant
decisions will put an end to ride-along programs because of the uncertainty as
to where officials' liability for bringing along a third party will begin. Finally,
by rejecting the government's argument that the media's presence serves

valuable law enforcement purposes, the Supreme Court has effectively closed
the only avenue the public had to monitor the actions of their law enforcement
officers and to hold the officers accountable for their actions.
The most immediate response to the Supreme Court's decision came from
the Ninth Circuit, which had to apply the Court's present reasoning to the
Hanlon case after its earlier opinion was vacated in the Court's instant ruling.
Though CNN and the other media defendants were not a party at the Supreme
Court because of the denial of certiorari, CNN's case was not resolved until the
32
1
Ninth Circuit heard the entire case again on remand. 3 In Bergerv. Hanlon,
the Ninth Circuit held that the media defendants had acted so closely with the
government agents as to be able to be held liable for a violation of the Fourth

127. Wilson, 526 U.S. at 625.
128. Id.; Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808, 810 (1999).
129. The rule stated in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,457 U.S. 800 (1982), is that law
enforcement officers are "shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." Id. at 818. It therefore follows that where
conduct does violate clearly established rights, the qualified immunity defense will not
protect the officers. 1d.
130. CNN, Inc. v. Berger, 526 U.S. 1154 (1999). The Washington Post, which
never ran a story or any of the pictures it took during the execution of the warrant, was
not sued.
131. Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999).
132. 188 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Amendment under Bivens and Section 1983 as "joint actors" with the federal
officers.'
However, the court also held that the media were not entitled to
assert qualified immunity as a defense,"3 citing the Supreme Court's opinion in
Wyatt v. Cole,13s which held that qualified immunity is not available to private
defendants charged with Section 1983 liability for invoking state replevin,
garnishment, or attachment statutes.' 36
This result is incredibly unfair; it holds the media liable solely because of
its joint action with the government, but it denies the media the same defense it
allows the government. Based on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Berger, the
media can be held liable for civil damages as state actors for violating an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. The case has been remanded to the district court'37 and it is likely that
the Ninth Circuit, if not the Supreme Court, will hear from these parties again.
There is no need to impose additional liability on the media. Even without
the Fourth Amendment cause of action, plaintiffs like the Bergers and the
Wilsons can still collect civil damages from the media through state law claims
such as trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.'
The Supreme Court could have resolved the issue by granting
certiorari to the media and overruling the Ninth Circuit's holding that the media
acted sufficiently in concert with the government to be held liable as state actors.
This would have avoided the establishment of a dangerous precedent that puts
the media in a "catch-22"; it can be held liable for violating the Fourth
Amendment, but is not entitled to the qualified immunity defense that the
government is granted. It would not, however, have left the media immune from
prosecution for their part in the ride-along, because their conduct would still be

subject to state law.
Wilson andHanlon are likely to significantly impact how the police and the
media interact in the future. 1 39 As it is now clearly established law that law

133. Id. at 1157.
134. Id. The law enforcement officers' lawyer in both cases, Richard Cordray,
agrees with the Ninth Circuit and does not think the media can use the qualified
immunity defense. Jonathan Ringel, CNN Tags Along for Press,Privacy Clash atHigh
Court, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Mar. 24, 1999, at 1.
135. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
136. Id. at 169. In Wyatt, the Court noted that its holding was narrowly limited to
the facts of that case. The Court also noted that its decision did not foreclose the
possibility that defendants faced with § 1983 liability in different circumstances could
be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or probable cause, or that

§ 1983 suits against private parties could require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens.
Id.
137. Berger v. Hanlon, 188 F.3d 1155, 1157 (9th Cir. 1999).
138. See id.; see also Eve Klindera, QualifiedImmunity for Cops (and Other
Public Officials) With Cameras: Let Common Law Remedies Ensure Press
Responsibility, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 431 (1999).
139. See James E. Grossberg & Jay Ward Brown, Can't We All Ride Along?
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enforcement officials violate the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals if they
allow the media to ride-along when executing a warrant in an individual's home,
the qualified immunity defense will no longer be available. In order to avoid
Bivens and Section 1983 liability, law enforcement officers will likely no longer
allow the media to accompany them in such situations. As a result, the public's
window into law enforcement officers' daily activities may effectively be closed
and the public shut out from its ability to hold officials accountable for abuses
of power.
Not only do the decisions in Wilson andHanlon close the media out of law
enforcement activities, they do not establish how far beyond official
police/media interactions such liability extends. This puts the future of media
ride-alongs inje6pardy. Hanlon involved a 75,000-acre ranch, and though the
media videotaped buildings near the Bergers' home and recorded a conversation
between the government agent and the Bergers that took place inside the home,
the media never actually entered the Bergers' home.' 40 Therefore, if law
enforcement officers violate the Fourth Amendment by bringing the media
within the bounds of a 75,000-acre private ranch, it seems likely that they would
violate the Amendment if they allowed the media to wait in the front yard, or
across the street. The question then arises as to whether officers who allow the
media to observe the execution of a warrant-authorized search of an individual's
car would be liable as the Fourth Amendment
also protects people's "effects"
14 1
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Because the Supreme Court held that it was the presence of the media, not
42
the officers' actions, that constituted the Fourth Amendment violation,
questions about liability extend even further. Though officers are authorized to
make warrantless arrests and seizures in public as long as the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe the suspect is a felon, 43 would the officerauthorized presence of the media push such a warrantless action over the Fourth
Amendment line? This unresolved issue, and the fact that a situation might arise
involving private property, will most likely keep officials from inviting the
media along in the first place.'"
Keeping the media at too far of a distance from the day-to-day dealings of
law enforcement officers, the likely result of the instant decisions' refusal to
resolve the media issue, is unsound policy. Allowing the media to ride along
with law enforcement officials makes sense for all of the reasons advanced in
Wilson-publication of the government's efforts to combat crime, facilitation of

Supreme Court Ponders Whether Press May Come When Police Execute Warrants,
LEGALTIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at S32.
140. Berger v. Hanlon, 129 F.3d 505, 509 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 526 U.S.

1154 (1999).

141. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
142. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 613-14 (1999).

143. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
144. See Grossberg & Brown, supra note 139, at S32.
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accurate reporting of law enforcement activities, protection of subjects through
the minimization of police abuses, and protection of the officers. 45 It is not
enough that the Court intimated that officers could videotape home entries as an
effort to ensure that the rights of homeowners were not violated." Without
media involvement, the public will never get the chance to view such
departmental tapings, especially if they reveal abuses.
The press serves as a medium for accountability; the information it provides
allows the public to make rational choices about how it wants the government
to operate. The media provides the public a rare unobstructed view of the daily
activities of law enforcement officers, and without its involvement, the public
would not have the same chance to monitor the conduct of public officials." 7
The Supreme Court's refusal to decide the media's case leaves the law
unnecessarily unresolved, and consequently closes the public's main window
into law enforcement activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Wilson and Hanlon, the Supreme Court addressed a split in the circuits
regarding whether the media's presence during the execution of a warrant in a
private home was a violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of the occupants
of the home. The Court held that it was. " However, because the law regarding
this issue was not clearly established, the law enforcement officers who were
being sued for damages under Bivens and Section 1983 were entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity and were therefore not liable.4 9 The Court
refused certiorari to the media defendants, however, leaving open the question
of the media's liability for such conduct. As a result, the media will likely be
forced to curtail its activity in the face of possible liability, cutting off much of
the public's ability to monitor its law enforcement officials.
LYNN S. BRACKMAN

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612.
Id. at 613.
See Grossberg & Brown, supranote 139, at S32.
Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 605 (1999).
Id. at 605-06.
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